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1.    Introduction
“…the real dynamic of terror lies in the telling of the story itself.”[1] 
erhaps the biggest mistake in the ‘War on Terror’ was the belief that the destruction of 
Al-Qaeda’s training camps would lead to the demise of the group, its affiliated 
movements and the Salafi Jihadist ideology to which the organization is understood by 
many to belong. Few paused to consider if Osama bin Laden and his cohorts were perhaps only the 
tip of a substantially larger iceberg.  Now, eleven years down the line, two wars and 1.283 trillion 
dollars later,[2] politicians and scholars alike are still devoting time into furthering our 
understanding of groups like Al-Qaeda and their associated Salafi Jihadist movement. More 
importantly, much focus has been given to the ideology that underlies the phenomenon of Salafi 
Jihadism in an effort to understand why it continues to inspire local initiatives and individuals to act 
on its behalf. 
 The utility of military action against a threat that clearly draws its strength from an ideology has 
often been questioned. Instead, focus has increasingly been given to understanding the ideology’s 
constituent narratives in an effort to explain the reasons behind its resonance with certain 
individuals. Documenting these narratives is a complicated process, as there cannot be said to be 
one narrative to which all elements of the movement adhere. An overview of geographically 
dispersed groups that allegedly adhere to Salafi Jihadist ideals shows that there are similarities and 
differences in narratives that may be attributed to differing geopolitical priorities on which the 
groups focus.[3] Instead, this paper argues that a more worthwhile endeavour may be to search for 
common elements in the varying Jihadist narratives that may form a master narrative that these 
groups share, and examine how such elements aid in promoting and spreading the ideology.    
The role of narratives is relatively novel in the field of terrorism studies, as well as the approaches 
used to analyze them. Nevertheless, studies that have been carried out on the topic have been 
fruitful in helping us understand how narratives can contribute to the furtherance of ideology, not 
least that of Al-Qaeda’s. An important contribution in this respect is that of Halverson et al. in their 
book ‘Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism’, which posits that despite there being differences in 
locally embedded narratives, master narratives exist that override these local narratives in 
importance.[4] This finding pertains fundamentally to Islam and Muslims, where the master 
narrative is found to constitute elements derived from ‘sacred texts’ and history.[5] More 
importantly, master narratives are by no means static and represent the embodiment of a constant 
re-interpretation of individual and collective perceptions. 
Research on Salafi Jihadist narratives has traditionally focused on the message framing process of 
Salafi Jihadists and why it has been able to, on occasion, motivate individuals to commit acts of 
terror. Although this has contributed to understanding of Jihadist narratives, it sidetracks the 
importance of actors external to the Salafi Jihadist movement that help leverage the message of the 
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Salafi Jihadists. This is best captured by R. Korteweg et. al in their view that the EU, in their 
counter-terrorism policies, would benefit from shifting their focus from the ‘causes’ of terrorism to 
the ‘background contributing factors…that lead to and catalyse the radicalization of EU citizens.’[6] 
In a similar strand, this paper aims at examining the support structures, primarily within the US and 
the EU, that help extremist messages proliferate and potentially increase the recruitment pool for 
Salafi Jihadists. The paper starts by examining similarities in the narratives of Salafi Jihadist groups 
that are argued to be the main constituents of a Salafi Jihadist master narrative. Here, Al-Qaeda is 
used as an example of an adherent to the Salafi Jihadist movement, primarily due to the plentitude 
of literature available on it. The paper then searches for similarities in the narratives of non-violent 
actors outside the Salafi Jihadist movement and demonstrates how such narrated parallels aid in 
further cementing core Jihadist messages in the minds of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Neither 
the intentionality nor motivation of external actors is analyzed, however the interplay of the latter’s 
narratives with that of the Salafi Jihadists is shown to play a significant role in supporting the 
proliferation of core extremist messages in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries.   
The relationship between mainstream Islamic beliefs and the Salafi Jihadist master narrative is also 
examined. The success of a narrative can be attributed to the extent to which it resonates with its 
target audience. Narratives that stray too far from established traditional, cultural and religious 
perceptions are often unsuccessful. Instead, the development of narratives must have existing ones 
at its core. The success of the emergent narrative is the extent to which the narrator can gradually 
integrate alternate meanings into existing ones to eventually reconstruct perceptions. Beginning 
with the religion on which Al-Qaeda’s ideology claims to be based, the paper first studies how Al-
Qaeda embeds its messages in Islamic texts and scriptures as a source of legitimacy, before 
identifying the key external supporters of its ideology.   
The paper’s conclusions find that the foreign policies of the US and EU, whilst not direct 
contributors to terrorism have so far pursued strategies of appeasement and compromise that have 
only perpetuated the credibility of Salafi Jihadist claims. This has not only undermined the 
democratic, secular values of these societies but has increasingly tolerated obvious advocates of the 
Salafi Jihadist ideology at home. The result has been the radicalization of Muslims and non-
Muslims alike as well as the steady proliferation of extremist messages and ideas in society. Any 
counter-narrative should thus be one that seeks to protect and promote individual liberties of human 
beings as opposed to being one that advances compromise; which is only damaging to the long-
lasting peace and prosperity of democratic societies. 
2.  Defining Narratives
In the simplest terms, a narrative is defined as a “coherent system of interrelated and sequentially 
organized stories.”[7] These stories are so deeply ingrained in cultures that they are an essential part 
of people’s identities and “who they are” in any given cultural setting.[8] An alternative definition 
presents narratives as discourse that works to produce meaning through the construction of “social 
realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their relational positions within a 
system of signification.”[9] This definition stresses the nature of narratives as stories, which can be 
reshaped over time and are both products of and contributors to the nature of existent cultures. 
Therefore, the cultural contexts in which narratives are embedded are extremely important to the 
understanding of narratives. 
Whereas narratives are frameworks of communication through which people are expected or taught 
to interact, master narratives override narratives in importance in that they are a crucial element or 
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reason for a certain culture’s existence. In ‘Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism’, Muslim 
‘culture’ is explained as having a master narrative that draws its stories from sacred texts and 
Muslim history.[10] Likewise, the master narrative of Salafi Jihadism can be argued to constitute 
alternative narratives according to cultural settings from which emerge common stories that 
transcend local borders. 
An important aspect of narratives is the manner in which they are related to the cultures that they 
aim to influence or else are already embedded within. In the introduction, a point was made on the 
process of redefining existent cultural narratives in a gradual manner to reshape perceptions. A 
study on radicalization in the UK traces this reframing process and demonstrates how key 
ingredients of Salafi Jihadist narratives include the dominating political and sociological situation, 
the interweaving of religious sources with the latter and the reconceptualizing of identity as a result 
of the two.[11] This view is similarly demonstrated in Fiona Adam’s ‘Global Liberalism versus 
Political Islam’ where narratives are framed in geopolitical and religious contexts. Here, ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ seek to reshape and/or strengthen certain norms through building on master 
narratives of Muslim cultures.[12] By doing so, Salafi Jihadists aim at building bridges between 
mainstream Islam and their ideology in an effort to rewrite Muslim cultures’ understandings of 
worldwide phenomena and religion. These ‘norm entrepreneurs’ understand the importance of solid 
master narratives in communicating their ideology and redefining the boundaries of acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviours. 
2.1 Religious Legitimization
Salafi-Jihadism is an outgrowth of the Salafiyya movement. The meaning of Salafism is derived 
from the Arabic word salaf, and is a movement or an understanding of Islam, which seeks to 
emulate the earliest forefathers of the religion.[13] Although it is often difficult to trace back 
Islamic reform movements to their precise moments of inception, key sources of inspiration for this 
movement are often attributed to 13/14th century Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya.[14] Ibn Taymiyya was 
a scholar belonging to one of the four main schools of Sunni jurisprudence - fiqh - whose religious 
edicts weigh heavily in today’s Salafi Jihadist narratives. For example, Ibn Taymiyya was an avid 
supporter of violent Jihad for Islamic world domination,[15] whose writings stressed the 
sovereignty of God’s laws, and apostatized manmade laws. This is very similar to today’s calls by 
Jihadist groups for the return to the Caliphate and the rejection of political participation in favour of 
imposing Islamic law or Shar’ia. Much of the more recent Jihadist propaganda that is often cited in 
literature can be traced back to Ibn Taymiyya’s work, albeit having evolved to accommodate the 
‘contemporary period.’[16] 
It would be inaccurate, however, to equate Salafism as it is practiced in Saudi Arabia for example 
with the form of Salafism that drives the violent Jihadist movement. Although both can be 
understood to draw from similar sources and espouse similar messages, there remains significant 
discord amongst Salafists as to the permissions for and justification of violence, the conditions for 
excommunicating fellow Muslims – takfir – and the relationship between society and state.[17] The 
third point is one of the most important, as the basis for recognizing Wahhabism (understood in this 
paper to be synonymous with Salafism) as the official state religion at the time of the founding of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the result of a compromise: the Wahabbis could dictate the 
religious practices of the Kingdom as long as they did not interfere with the holders of the throne, 
the Saud family.[18] In line with the Islamic understanding of fitna,[19] Salafism within countries 
respects the formal positions of authority and decries violence against the ruling elite that could sow 
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discord in society. With Salafi Jihadists, this is clearly not the case as is made public in their fatwas 
and declarations calling for the violent overthrow of the ‘apostate’ regimes. 
The divides in Salafist thought are many and, of the most relevant, are the conditions and 
explanations provided for the justification of violence. These depart from the Salafist mainstream in 
that they progressively broaden the boundaries in which violent Jihad is permitted. Aptly 
documented by Quintan Wiktorowicz, ideologues and ‘thinkers’ in the Salafi Jihadist movement 
have merely ‘adapted’ the understandings of reformists like Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya, ‘…
stretching them to their logical conclusion in a way that increased the permissible scope of 
violence.’[20] This broadening of boundaries is best exemplified by the difference in conditions or 
‘voiders’ by which a Muslim can be made an apostate.[21] On the one hand, the Wahabbist 
doctrine, which can be argued to represent mainstream Salafism, takes into consideration both the 
beliefs and actions of Muslims as indicators of whether or not one they are apostates. The former 
embodies a Muslims’ beliefs in Allah’s sole supremacy – tawhid – and likewise accepts that Islam is 
God’s supreme religion on Earth. And thus, Salafism preaches that a Muslim may not be made an 
apostate unless he/she openly proclaims that they do not hold the aforementioned beliefs to be true.
[22] For Salafi Jihadists, belief plays a minimal role and it is the actions of Muslims that take 
priority. In this context, the apparent rejection of any one of such ‘voiders’ is immediate proof of 
apostasy.[23] 
Secondly, religious interpretations often involve the redefining of religious terms and concepts to fit 
the contexts of Jihadist narratives. An example of this is seen in the Salafi Jihadist use of the term 
jahiliyya, which in Islamic theology refers to a ‘specific historical period’, but is re-contextualized 
to represent a ‘state of affairs’ that allegedly mirrors the deviation of Muslims from the ‘Law of 
Allah’ and their adherence to manmade laws.[24] In this version of Sayyid Qutb’s ‘apostasy’, 
literally any Muslim can be made an apostate if he/she is not seen as obeying the strictest form of 
Shari’a. The view propagated by Qutb and other ideologues in the Salafi Jihadist movement is that 
the way to prove or ascertain that a Muslim is not an apostate is through actively ‘struggling’ 
against those that wish to impose manmade laws. Or, as put by Wiktorowicz: ‘This dichotomous 
struggle for God’s sovereignty on earth eliminates the middle ground and sets the stage for a 
millennial, eschatological battle between good and evil.’[25] 
Having said this, the continued influence of such scholars’ work on today’s understandings of Islam 
begs the question of why medieval interpretations still hold sway in some Islamic societies today. 
This can perhaps best be explained by examining the evolution of the interpretation and application 
process of Islamic religious sources. Historically, interpretation was a task of a group of religious 
scholars that were well studied in the fundamentals of Islam and were called upon to provide 
religious rulings – Shari’a.[26] These religious rulings did not represent the work of only one 
scholar but reflected scholarly consensus – ijma’.[27] In stark contrast to the individual manner in 
which many 19th and 20th century reformers of Islam and scholars interpreted and applied their 
exegesis of Islamic sources, medieval interpretation was a much more complex, refined and social 
form of providing religious jurisprudence through community consensus. James Piscatori similarly 
finds that ‘the meaning of scripture no longer needs to be interpreted by a religious establishment 
but, rather, lies in the eyes of the beholder.’[28] The degradation of authority of religious Islamic 
institutions may be attributed to their connections to repressive state regimes, where Jihadists have 
often stated the former as being the ‘puppets’ of the latter. Thus, with the ‘doors of 
ijtihad’ (interpretation)[29] closed, there has been a steady degeneration of ijtihad and much of the 
present day interpretations and understandings of Islam are based on the medieval interpretations of 
the schools – madhabs - of religious jurisprudence of old.
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The lack of an authoritative body that regulates and oversees the process of ijtihad, and the 
availability of Islamic sources rife with violence provides a rich source for Salafi Jihadists to draw 
from for their narratives. Within Islamic texts, the concept of ‘Jihad’ is often portrayed as a two-fold 
struggle: the ‘smaller jihad’ and the ‘greater jihad’.[30] The ‘smaller jihad’ or the ‘Jihad of the 
sword’ represents the violent struggle against non-Muslims in an attempt to proselytize them.[31] 
The ‘greater jihad’ represents an inner struggle to vanquish immoral and evil behaviours.[32] In the 
Qur’an as well as other Islamic sources, there exist a plethora of Suras (verses) that relate to Jihad 
in both forms, with the former often cited by Salafi Jihadist ideologues as religious justification. 
Although the degree and permissibility of the ‘smaller Jihad’ remains a contested debate in 
Salafism, Salafi Jihadists generally espouse the view that it is a religiously sanctioned duty of each 
and every Muslim – fard ‘ayn.[33]
2.2 Assigning Blame and Crafting Conspiracies
Religious sources are not the only support for the Salafi Jihadist master narrative. In order to reach 
full effect, stories have to resonate with their target audience on several levels. On a cognitive level, 
this is achievable through ensuring that the underpinning messages of narratives do not stray too far 
from established cultural frames.[34] Narratives should thus aim to build on the current situation of 
the target audience through gradually attributing common perceptions to alternative themes/stories.
[35] In other words, if Group A understands phenomenon a to be a function of b, a slight reframing 
process would perhaps attempt to explain phenomenon a through the introduction of c and d, in 
connection with b. 
In the Saladi Jihadist context, the worldwide suffering, endless humiliation, poverty and oppression 
of many Muslims (phenomenon a) is not only the fault of the corrupt governments of these 
countries (b), but is also due to their deviation from Islam (c) that results primarily from the brutal 
colonization of many of these countries (d). This is one example of many, where the Jihadists seek 
to group the grievances and disaffections of Muslims around the world and provide easy-to-grasp 
explanations for their misfortune; the appeal of their narratives a measure of the ‘…simplicity of 
message and linkages with real-world grievances’.[36] In his book, ‘The Future of Political Islam’, 
Graham Fuller adequately summarizes how the concept of humiliation is one of the key supporting 
elements of the master narrative: 
“The deepest underlying source of Muslim anguish and frustration today lies in the dramatic decline 
of the Muslim World…from the leading civilization in the world for over one thousand years into a 
lagging, impotent and marginalized region of the world. This stunning reversal of fortune 
obsessively shapes the impulses underlying much contemporary Islamist rhetoric.”[37]
This reversal is attributed to the oppression of colonial hegemons, as well as the supposed 
abandonment of Muslims of their ‘true’ religion.[38] [39]The regimes in power during Qutb’s time, 
as well as those that remain in power today are viewed as corrupt US/Israeli puppet governments 
that are not true Muslims and should be replaced. This view is taken from many sources and finds 
expression in the Qur’an where it is stated that non-Muslims cannot govern Muslims.[40]
Before the establishment of Al-Qaeda ‘Core’, Jihadist efforts were focused on the ‘near-enemy’. In 
other words, the shared view was that apostate governments in the Muslim world needed to be 
overthrown in order to establish strong Islamic states. Only then could such states attempt to 
challenge the West and the rest of the world. The ‘near enemy’ was the main target whereas for Al-
Qaeda and groups inspired by its ideology, the real enemy is the ‘far enemy’, which helped support 
the ‘near enemy’ and keep them in power at the expense of its peoples. By eliminating these foreign 
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support structures for the apostate governments first, the ‘near enemy’ would then be easier to 
defeat.[41] 
Placing this into context, the master narrative of Salafi Jihadists has increasingly shifted its focus to 
not only foreign governments but also foreign populations as pools for recruitment. The master 
narrative is aimed at radicalizing not only Muslims at ‘home’ but also those from Muslim diasporas 
in the US and Europe. The process is complicated yet models have been adopted that attempt to 
explain how core messages of the master narrative are developed for this purpose.
The first obvious element of the Salafi Jihadist master narrative is its consideration of the political 
situation, and its selective adoption of ‘causes’ for which it claims to represent. Literature has 
indicated that with regards to Al-Qaeda, the core political themes on which its ideology rests 
emerge and disappear depending on their relevance to the master narrative. The master narrative 
focuses on the sufferings and grievances of fellow Muslims in one of two theaters: 1. Countries 
where Muslims are the minority and, 2. Muslim-majority countries that are perceived to be 
suffering heavy losses due to foreign intervention. The grievances of Muslims in both cases are 
caused by non-Muslim regimes and are thus framed as a war against Islam. 
The Palestinian issue is a cornerstone of discussion and politics in many Middle Eastern and North 
African countries, where societies are increasingly antipathetic to Israel’s policies and, by 
extension, Jews. Capitalizing on these negative emotions that have become inherent to most Muslim 
cultures, Al-Qaeda ideologues have, from the onset, defined the enemy as ‘Zionist’ and ‘Crusader’; 
terminology that is steeped in Islamic concepts and holds negative connotations for many Muslims. 
Although the Jewish people are occasionally referred to as the chosen ones in the Qur’an,[42] and 
even acknowledged as the rightful receivers of Palestine from Allah,[43] there remains a plethora of 
verses in the Qur’an that contradict this position.[44] As rightly stated by Piscatori, ‘…ideas 
concerning issues from popular participation to social injustice are far from stagnant, and Qur’anic 
meanings are nothing if not ambiguous.’[45]
Al-Qaeda ideologues advance an anti-Semitic worldview that frames current conflicts in a religious 
context in order to advance the rhetoric of a Jewish conspiracy aimed at the destruction of Islam and 
Muslims.[46] This rhetoric is also not lost on the mainstream Muslims outside the Jihadist realm, 
where anti-Semitic propaganda is plentiful in Muslim media and sanctioned by various authoritative 
figures and bodies, such as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Saudi ministry of education.[47] 
[48]
Although few studies have been carried out on the extent to which Muslims believe such a 
conspiracy, various Pew Poll surveys have carefully documented the rising hostility and anti-
Semitism in many Muslim countries.[49]  A quotation from the translated works of al-Zawahiri 
states, “The one slogan that has been well understood by the nation and to which it has been 
responding for the past fifty years is the call for Jihad against Israel.”[50]
According to a study of the content of conversations on Jihadist websites leading up to and 
following Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, the focal point of the narrative shifted to place 
increased emphasis on the notion of regional domination by the ‘Jewish-Crusader’ alliance 
thereafter.[51] Thus, not only did the war provide a geopolitical opportunity for Al Qaeda 
ideologues in legitimizing Jihad in Iraq, but it also gave them an opportunity to reinforce other 
dimensions of the narrative:[52]
“America has attacked Iraq and soon will also attack Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan. You 
should be aware the infidels cannot bear the existence of Muslims and want to capture their 
resources and destroy them.”[53]
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 These examples are a testament to the importance of political opportunities in the crafting of the 
Al-Qaeda/Salafi Jihadist ideology. The link between radicalization and mobilization is still fraught 
with uncertainty, however the role of socialization is extremely important. Finding little evidence 
pointing to a terrorist personality or profile that makes one more prone to radicalization, the 
socialization processes employed by Jihadists have been found various scholars to bear more 
fruitful results[54]; more specifically, the recreation of an identity through the gradual 
indoctrination of the would-be Jihadist to an alternate world and self-view. The worldview that is 
propagated builds on the political aspect of the master narrative that works at alienating the would-
be Jihadist from the society in which he/she lives. The religious aspect of the master narrative 
appeals to the fissures in the belief system of the would-be Jihadist who is understood as attempting 
to reconcile between his/her Islamic beliefs and modernity; more specifically, the non-Islamic 
societies in which he/she lives.[55] 
The master narrative has a strategic outlook in that it works to create both real and perceived 
hostilities between Muslims and non-Muslims; cementing a perception of a ‘War on Islam’. The 
primary purpose of the master narrative is to drive a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims, 
through funneling messages and ideas through a religious filter. On an analysis provided by the 
Jihadist group al-Ghuraaba, Mark Huband notes: ‘…At the heart of the al-Ghuraaba analysis is the 
intention of justifying – as well as promoting, and even celebrating – the intense feeling of 
alienation from non-Muslim Britain…This is done by stressing the primacy of the individual 
identity, and then explaining that identity purely as a product of belief – belief that is the result of 
the ‘perfection’ Islam has offered its adherents.’[56]
Offering itself up as a perfected, purified version of Islam, the Salafi Jihadist master narrative is the 
reflection of the broadest interpretations of Salafism in current geopolitics and acts as a platform for 
radicalization with the ultimate goal being the mobilization of action. 
2.3 Islamism and the Salafi Jihadist Master Narrative 
There is a danger of singling out Salafi Jihadist groups without taking into consideration the much 
broader and widespread phenomenon of Islamism. Here, a distinction must first be made between 
the two. Where Salafi Jihadism is defined as a transnational Jihad against the ‘far enemy’, Islamism 
is “A spectrum of movements committed to Islam as a total way of life and as a viable alternative to 
Western secular ideologies.”[57] Within this spectrum, there are violent Islamist groups such as al-
Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), and non-violent ones that either reject violence or else 
condone it only for specific circumstances. 
Regardless of where these movements lie, they mostly accept Islam as a modern political ideology 
and seek to first ‘Islamize’ their own societies and states, with a long-term goal of Islamic world 
domination.[58] The categorization of Islamist groups is highly contested in academia. In 
discussing groups like the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) for example, many scholars have contrasting 
opinions. This may be due to the fact that many of today’s Jihadist organizations, like Al-Qaeda, 
grew out of the MB. However, organizations that reject the use of violence have been given relative 
freedom to operate in the US and Europe.  
A working definition for the purpose of this paper defines moderate Islamist organizations as 
organizations that have been willing to and have often participated in the political processes in their 
countries.[59] This is important as it stands in stark contrast to both Salafi Jihadist and radical 
Islamist groups who are usually not interested in political participation as they believe it to be a 
confrontation with Allah’s divine rule or hakimiyya.[60] Islamist groups can thus be defined as 
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groups that a) have participated to some extent in political arenas; b) reject the notion of 
transnational Jihad and prefer to work within defined borders; and c) limit the use of violent Jihad 
to very specific circumstances and prefer a non-revolutionary means in spreading their ideology.
[61]
Two points require reinforcement. First, whilst many Islamist organizations have adopted a different 
path in spreading their own ideologies or da’wa, the ideologies they spread share many similarities 
to Salafi Jihadism. Very often, the narratives draw from or else build on one another. If one were to 
observe the meanings and understandings of Jihad in the context of the MB narrative and that of Al-
Qaeda’s, many similarities can be identified. The main difference between the underlying ideologies 
of the various groups is not so much the goals and objectives but, rather, the means by which they 
achieve these goals and objectives. 
Secondly, there are significant differences in the implementation of ideology. The two opposing 
approaches are a ‘grassroots’, bottom-up approach or else a ‘top-down approach.’[62] The former 
seeks to Islamize a culture in a gradual manner that focuses on individuals, families and 
communities and preaches its propaganda and ideology accordingly. The latter seeks to enforce 
religion onto societies without much focus on individual religiosity. The MB is a prime example of 
the former where, instead of trying to overrun the government and impose its ideology, the group 
uses a combination of social services, sermons, and the distribution of religious material to persuade 
people that Islam is the only solution to their woes.[63] The MB also rides on the policy failures of 
local governments and populist sentiment in offering itself and ‘Islam’ as the only alternative. 
Indeed, the group’s recent success in the presidential elections in Egypt may arguably be testament 
to their methodology.
The objectives of the MB are also not as clear as those of other organizations. Regardless of the 
violent acts that have been attributed to the group, the group itself does not openly espouse violence 
on its official website. The mission statement of the group is one of the few exceptions: “Allah is 
our objective; the Prophet is our leader; the Quran is our law; Jihad is our way; dying in the way of 
Allah is our highest hope.”[64] The use of the word ‘Jihad’, followed by the last phrase in the 
statement, “…dying in the way of Allah”, indicates that the ‘Jihad’ referred to here may be more 
than an internal struggle. Furthermore, in stating that the ‘Quran is our law…’ the group also makes 
clear its desire to have an Islamic state which is ruled under Shari’a. 
The significance of the similarities in the mottos and proclamations of groups is that, irrespective of 
open calls for violent Jihad, having similar or identical core messages to those of the Salafi Jihadist 
master narrative lends a measure of credibility to the Salafi Jihadist master narrative. Having earlier 
demonstrated how narratives are a key part of cultures in framing communicative contexts, the 
more certain words or phrases circulate within society, the more they become fixed into such 
contexts. By embracing the concept of Jihad, promoting Shari’a and coupling positive connotations 
to dying for religion or religious purposes, Muslim populations begin to internalize and more 
readily accept the concepts of martyrdom and Jihad. What’s more, even if the majority of a 
population does not resort to violence or openly endorse it, the strengthening of the Salafi Jihadist 
master narrative in some countries may increase the number of sympathizers to the imagined 
‘cause.’[65] Likewise, the lack of public endorsement for violence by many Islamist institutions by 
no means indicates that the latter reject its eventual or conditional use. It only means that they 
prioritize political and social involvement in the countries that they operate in an attempt to garner 
support for their ideology; which at the end pursues many of the same goals that many Jihadist 
organizations do. 
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A good example of an Islamist organization whose narratives bear striking resemblance to that of 
the Salafi Jihadist master narrative is Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). On their British website, the group 
clearly outlines its goal of working towards the reestablishment of the Caliphate or Khilafah and 
how Islam calls the Ummah ‘…towards the Shar’i obligation of establishing the Khilafah in 
Pakistan as well as spreading it throughout the world.’[66] Likewise, in the proceedings of the 
group’s first conference in Lebanon on the 1st of May, 2012, members of the group address the 
‘foreign agenda’ that has been ‘…appointed to fight to fight Allah and His Messenger and the 
believers, and to realize the interests of the Zionists and disbelieving colonialists’.[67] This 
sentence alone captures some of the core messages that constitute the Salafi Jihadist master 
narrative. The ‘foreign agenda’ are the repressive regimes in the Middle East (in this case Syria), 
who are at a war with Islam and are products of the ‘Zionists’. The remainder of the speech further 
emphasizes a disconnect between ‘Allah’ and his ‘believers’ and the unbelievers, thus deepening the 
wedge between Muslim and non-Muslims.      
With the advent of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and then again in OIF, Islamist and Jihadist 
groups were fast to declare the wars as the next assault on Islam:
 “The campaign against Iraq has aims that go beyond Iraq into the Arab Islamic world […]. 
Its first aim is to destroy any effective military force in the proximity of Israel. Its second aim 
is to consolidate the supremacy of Israel…”[68]
Here, the war is framed as not only being against Islam but one that seeks to further strengthen and 
protect the position of Israel in the region. Al-Zawahiri strategically makes the reference to Israel 
and the US, emphasizing their alliance as part of a larger conspiracy of encroachment upon the so-
called ‘Arab Islamic World.’
In light of narrated parallels, the existence of organizations like HT in the US and Europe are 
arguably potential inciters of violence. Whereas their messages may not directly call on Muslims to 
bear arms on behalf of the religion and their grieving brothers and sisters, they nevertheless add 
weight to the argument and ‘model for reality’ that the Salafi Jihadist master narrative propagates.
[69] Regardless of whether or not these organizations promote the use of violence, the manner in 
which they share some of the more utopian goals commonly only associated with Al-Qaeda and 
cohorts (like the global establishment of Shar’ia) should have caused heads to turn by now.   
2.4 Other Agents boosting the Salafi Jihadist Narrative
Although many Muslims tend to differentiate between Wahhabism and Salafism, it can be argued 
that there are very little differences between the two.[70] Elements within Saudi Arabia and the 
Saudi royal family have supported the Salafi Jihadist master narrative through allowing, for 
example, the Protocols to be taught in Saudi-run and supported schools around the world. A more 
important example is the role the Kingdom played in financially supporting the emergence of the 
Taliban. Although the aid from the CIA to the Arab-Afghan mujahideen stopped after the defeat of 
the Soviet Union in 1989, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan continued providing funds and backing to the 
Taliban’s fight to take control of the country. 
The role of madrassas in Central Asia is yet another incubator of the radical ideology that underpins 
Salafi Jihadism. Although the madrassas in Pakistan were originally based on the reformist 
ideology of Deobandism,[71] Saudi Arabia has more recently been exporting Wahabbism as an 
alternative. Both Deobandism and Wahabbism share many narratives with prominent Islamist and 
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Salafi Jihadist groups in the sense that they both heavily reject Western influence and ideas and seek 
to return to “classical, conservative Islam.”[72] The Taliban, whose militants were increasingly 
provided for by the Deobandi madrassas, are a prime example of the manifestation of this ideology 
at a state level. 
After the killing of bin Laden, many Islamist organizations including Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), 
expressed their condolences and disseminated leaflets in support of bin Laden’s ideology.[73] This 
is extremely significant as organizations like HT are considered to be “moderate” Islamist 
organizations and often have headquarters in European cities. This being said, the master narratives 
of Salafi Jihadism are not solitary manifestations but also the products of the support of likeminded 
organizations. 
The popular support of leaders is often a good source for providing insight with regards to 
narratives within specific countries and cultures. Just because the US or Western countries do not 
find solace in the explanations of life provided by the likes of the Egyptian Islamic theologian Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi does not mean that many Egyptians and Arabs do not. In fact, so popular is this 
individual’s work that Foreign Policy magazine placed him on the ‘top 20 public intellectuals of the 
World’ list.[74] So what are al-Qaradawi’s views? 
 “…throughout history, Allah has imposed upon the [Jews] people who would punish them for 
their corruption. The last punishment was carried out by [Adolf] Hitler…Allah willing, the 
next time it will be at the hand of the believers.”[75]
In an interview with the BBC[76] he said: "I consider this type of martyrdom operation as an 
evidence of God's justice”.
In providing a counter-narrative for Salafi Jihadism, countries must first seek to eliminate the 
support structures of its master narrative. Namely, Islamist groups and organizations that hide under 
a cloak of supposed non-violence whilst simultaneously indoctrinating Muslims with radical ideas. 
This is not an easy task and calls into question whether or not it is actually possible. Is it worthwhile 
to attempt to reverse years of indoctrination of Muslim countries? Is it possible for the US and the 
West to bring to bear pressure on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in dealing with and reversing the years 
of support it has provided to Jihadists? Would doing so not be simply reprimanding these countries 
for the sincere religious beliefs to which they adhere? 
3. Positioning the Narratives
There are linkages between understandings of Islam in not only the Islamist and Salafi Jihadist 
master narratives, but also mainstream narratives of Islam. Mainstream Islamic narratives indirectly 
support the master narratives of Salafi Jihadists because in some instances there exists considerable 
overlap between the two. The most obvious linkage between the two is the religion. Because the 
Salafi Jihadist master narrative draws credence from its usage of Islamic sources, it can be said to 
stigmatize the open rejection of Muslim communities to violent practices insofar as religion is 
implicated.
It is oft repeated in the media, official statements and scholarly work that the majority of Muslims 
reject the extreme interpretation of Islam practiced and propagated by the Salafi Jihadist movement. 
Nevertheless, a cursory glance at the slogans and posters hoisted by ‘mainstream’ Muslim 
populations in and following the recent revolutions of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ and in similar 
demonstrations implies a more intimate connection between core Salafi Jihdist messages and 
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Islamic cultural ones. Although not a claim to Muslim endorsement of violence, the sentiments 
conveyed, as Christina Hellmich puts it, ‘..could have been taken right from an al-Qaeda 
propaganda video.’[77] Thus, a question of how Jihadist narratives are formulated has much to 
benefit from examining mainstream values and beliefs in Muslim communities, as well as how the 
Salafi Jihadist master narrative builds on and simultaneously aims at radicalizing these very same 
values and beliefs. 
Sookhdeo[78] provides an inverted pyramid (see below) that breaks down Muslim populations into 
categories. The basis of his argument is that, although Muslims on different levels of the pyramid 
share the identity of being ‘Muslim’, the level to which the core messages of the lower, more 
extreme levels will resonate with or else be internalized by other levels depends on the extent to 
which they practice the religion.[79] The correlation of Muslim piety to radicalization readiness is 
something that has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature, but the reverberations of 
messages up the pyramid and into the heart of mainstream Islam can nevertheless be argued to 
constitute the main thrust of the Salafi Jihadist master narrative. Thus, it is perhaps not only the 
extent to which Islam is practiced, but also the extent to which the master narrative reshapes 
mainstream concepts and interpretations of Islam so that they infiltrate up to the upper, non-radical 
levels.  
Graham Fuller breaks down Muslim communities and reaches a similar conclusion where Muslims 
can be charted along a spectrum, from the fundamentalists to the liberal (terms differ).[80] Fuller 
also quotes John Voll[81] on the position of the ‘traditionalists’:
“…the traditionalists (or conservatives) seek to hold the lid down on too rapid change; they 
represent a force of conservation and preservation, a critical factor of cultural and 
community coherence and continuity in times of turmoil. But this school will also adapt to 
new conditions when necessary to keep Islam alive.”[82] 
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Source: Figure excerpted from Patrick Sookhdeo, Ideas Matter; How to Undermine the Extremist 
Ideology Behind al Qaeda, (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 2011), p.244. 
Being rather passive in their steadfast adherence to societal and cultural norms, traditionalists do not 
contribute to change but are recipients of change. With the existence of Islamist groups like the MB 
and HT that have worked for years in reshaping cultural norms in Muslim societies, the 
traditionalists’ views of cultural and societal norms are in danger of becoming radicalized.
The more the ideologies of the lower levels infiltrate to the higher levels of the pyramid, the more 
endangered the Muslims in the higher levels are. This is because exposure to mainstream elements 
of Islam, which have been perverted by the radical factions, increasingly challenge the less radical 
Muslim identities that cultured and traditional Muslims have built for themselves. It is this stage, 
where uncertainty takes hold, which many radicals attempt to seize upon. Thus, the battle for the 
hearts and minds of Muslims should not attempt to start with the radicalized elements but should 
focus on maintaining and protecting the comfort zones of Muslims who are comfortable with their 
Islamic identity and do not necessarily adhere to mainstream concepts.
4. Western Narratives, or the Lack Thereof
The main issue nowadays seems to be the obsession of Western governments with finding a 
politically correct name for the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism.  The war has been framed from 
its inception as being one against ‘terror’, an emotion. Governments have been increasingly mindful 
of reminding the public that this is not a war against Islam, but rather one against a fringe 
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movement that “…perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam”,[83] whose ideology was “incubated in 
Afghanistan when it became a failed state,[84] and is overall “…rejected by Muslim scholars and 
the vast majority of Muslim scholars.”[85] 
The problem with such statements is that they are only partly true and do not reflect the bigger 
picture in an accurate manner. The idea of exploiting Islam to serve political ends is incorrect when 
one takes into account that the religion is believed by many of its adherents to provide answers and 
solutions in most spheres of public and private life; din wa dawla - religion and state. Thus, even in 
countries where Shari’a is not implemented, legislation in some areas is still dictated by Islamic 
norms. 
The terming of Salafi Jihadism as a ‘fringe movement’ belies the fact that it is not only Al-Qaeda or 
fringe groups that support the movement, but various other actors, organizations and states. The 
incubation of radical beliefs in Afghanistan also only partially contributed to radicalism, as the roots 
of radicalism we see today precede the war in Afghanistan. Islamist ideologies are the product of a 
long line of reformist versions of Islam, which go back centuries, and Salafi Jihadism is arguably 
the tip of these ideologies’ spears. 
Renunciation of violence is often welcomed by Western societies. Islamist organizations that 
condemn violence are left to operate so long as they condemn violent acts. The problem with this is 
the West’s dismissal of non-violent elements of Islamist narratives that do, in the long run, 
contribute to acts of violence. The mainstream messages of Islamist narratives are ones that 
promote, glorify, and seek to achieve Jihad in the way of Allah. The only difference between them 
and Salafi Jihadist narratives is that they are more strategic in communicating their desired end 
effects and seemingly reject violent tactics. The steady proliferation of core Islamist messages into 
Muslim populations fly directly in the face of Western efforts of curtailing the spread of extremism. 
Therefore, it is meaningless if scholars and clerics are renouncing violence if they are, 
simultaneously, encouraging acts of violence under a holy pretext. 
A conference held in July 2011 titled the “Founding Conference of the Arab-Islamic Gathering to 
Support the Option of Resistance’, saw the gathering of groups and organizations ranging from 
Hamas and the MB to the supposed religious authority of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb, to 
discuss the options of ‘resistance’ in occupied Muslim territories.[86] Although the focus was 
mainly the Palestinian territories, it also included Muslim countries that have more recently 
experienced brutal government crackdowns in response to their protests (i.e. Syria) as well as 
Kashmir and Chechnya. Authoritative figures in religious bodies like Al Azhar in Egypt continue to 
religiously sanction the use of violence against the ‘Crusader Invasion’ by issuing fatwas.[87] In 
communities where the collective nature of the predominant religion imposes itself on the 
behaviours and norms of societies, those capable of shaping and influencing it the most are the ones 
that (sadly) have the final say.
The master narrative of Salafi Jihadism has heavily influenced the terms, the understanding and the 
context in which the battle of ideas and discourse is fought. The post 9/11 wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have increasingly been framed in a religious context in Islamist and Salafi Jihadist 
narratives. Moreover, several officials in Western countries have tended to respond to such 
accusations in an apologetic manner, thus affirming that the narratives may indeed be sound. In 
focusing on and giving bin Laden and al-Zawahiri’s narratives more credit than deserved, 
governments have began to expand freedoms which are enabling a further strengthening of Islamist 
positions in Western countries. 
An excellent example of the lengths some countries have gone to in ensuring that their Muslim 
communities do not feel ‘discriminated’ against is the introduction of Shari’a courts. Disputes are 
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settled in line with Shari’a law, and the rulings are then passed to the country courts or the High 
Court for enforcement. These courts have the right to enforce but not to amend the decisions passed 
down to them and, in doing so, undermine the country’s entire judicial system. By allowing Shari’a 
courts to operate in the country, the UK has succeeded in not only succumbing to the desires of the 
Islamists but has also reinforced their agenda of the eventual world domination of Islam and an 
eventual return to the Caliphate. 
Finally, Western governments seem to believe that by strengthening the Islamists, they prevent 
Muslims from becoming Jihadists. Whilst attempting to play Islamists off against the Salafi 
Jihadists, the West has failed in providing a coherent counter narrative that is based on Western 
values. In part, this reticence is caused by the concerns of governments that they are infringing on 
Muslims’ religious freedom. Yet the failure of finding a middle ground has lead to the advancement 
of Islamist and Jihadist narratives in Western societies. 
5. Conclusion
In providing a counter-narrative, the Western world should do more in the way of understanding the 
elements that Islamist and Jihadist master narratives share. They should also be wary of 
inadvertently advancing the cause of such groups. Western societies have a much better opportunity  
in providing a counter-narrative to their own Muslim populations that can more effectively 
undermine the predominant Islamist and Jihadist narratives. Given the highly unfavourable views 
held of Christianity, Judaism and the West in general, it is futile to attempt to reverse years of 
fermenting hostility fostered by Islamist and Jihadist indoctrination. Instead, it is probably more 
likely that efforts to roll back and contain the radical narratives in Western countries will provide 
the most effective counter narrative yet. 
When providing such a counter-narrative, governments have to first recognize the importance of 
agents and ‘norm entrepreneurs’, which reside within their own borders and act as effective support 
structures for Jihadist and Islamist narratives. By diminishing the strength of agents and structures 
within the confines of the existing laws, the effect of such narratives are likely to decline in 
strength. It is also important to understand that there are millions of Muslims in the Western world 
who enjoy the sanctity of democratic freedoms and understand their value for further personal, 
spiritual, and material progression. They are Muslims who have formed their own understandings of 
religion that are often rejected by the majority of Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries due 
to their divergence from the mainstream tenets of Islam. 
The tolerance of groups and individuals who propagate Islamist and Jihadist agendas and narratives 
in the West not only infringes on and alienates such Muslims, but also promotes the spread of 
Islamism. An alternative approach for Western countries may be to focus more on integrated, 
‘cultural’ Muslims and provide them with the protection and solidarity that they need in a time 
when they are increasingly being pressured into passively accepting Islamist beliefs. 
The fight against the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism is one that will have to be fought from 
within. The underlying ideologies of both Islamism and Salafi Jihadism are not ideologies that are 
utterly disconnected from the religion. Nor are they ones that hold minimal sway in Muslim 
countries. On the contrary, the Islamist forces embodied in grassroots movements like the MB have 
spread dramatically over the past century, attracting a large number of followers as a unifying 
alternative to Nasser’s attempt at Pan-Arabism. It has seen avid supporters in Saudi Arabia, whose 
Wahabbi doctrine has heavily cross-fertilized with that of the MB’s, as well as large backing of 
madrassas in Asia.
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Narratives are not simply stories but are the primers of action because they shape populations’ 
perceptions of the world. An effective counter-narrative needs to start today and needs to openly 
confront the Muslim populations and radical revolutionary movements that attempt to overrun 
societies and drastically alter them. Radical organizations cannot be tolerated and must be held 
accountable for both their action and hateful speech; especially those that attempt to use their 
religion as a pretext for violent acts. 
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